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Abstract
Economic growth requires that firms adopt new technologies. However, it may be
insuﬃcient in less competitive industries from the social welfare point of view. In this
case, a government subsidy is necessary. We present an analysis of firms’ adoption
of new technology and government subsidization policy in a Stackelberg duopoly with
diﬀerentiated goods. The technology itself is free, but each firm must expend a fixed
set-up cost, such as training employees. There are several cases related to optimal policies
depending on the set-up costs and whether the goods are substitutes or complements. In
particular, there are two cases.
1. Social welfare is maximized when only the Stackelberg leader adopts the new
technology, but no firm adopts the new technology without a subsidy. Then, the
government should subsidize only the leader, which is a discriminatory policy. (Case
5 of Theorem 1 and Case 3-(1)-ii of Theorem 2)
2. Social welfare is maximized when both firms adopt the new technology, but only the
leader adopts the new technology without a subsidy. Then, the government should
subsidize only the follower. This policy is not discriminatory because adoption is
the dominant strategy for the leader. (Case 2 of Theorem 1)
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1. Introduction
Firms’ adoption of new technology is very important for economic growth. However, it may
be insuﬃcient in less competitive industries from the social welfare point of view. In this
case, a government subsidy is necessary. We present an analysis of firms’ adoption of new
technology and government subsidization policy in a Stackelberg duopoly with diﬀerentiated
goods. The technology itself is free, but each firm must expend a fixed set-up cost, such as
training employees.
We analyze the following three-stage game1.
1. First stage: The government determines the subsidy for each firm.
2. Second stage: The leader decides whether to adopt the new technology and then deter-
mines its output.
3. Third stage: The follower decides whether to adopt the new technology and then deter-
mines its output.
At the sub-game perfect equilibria, the number of adopting firms decreases from three to
zero as the set-up costs increase.
Social welfare is defined as the sum of consumer surplus and firms’ profits, which is equal to
consumer utility minus production costs, including the new technology set-up costs. Subsidies
are financed by lump-sum taxes on consumers, which are not related to the goods produced by
firms. Excluding income eﬀects, these taxes do not aﬀect demand for the goods, and are oﬀset
by subsidies.
There are several cases for optimal policies depending on the set-up costs and whether the
goods produced are substitutes or complements. In particular, we highlight the following
cases:
1. Social welfare ismaximizedwhen only the Stackelberg leader adopts the new technology,
but no firm adopts the new technology without a subsidy. Then, the government should
subsidize only the leader, which is a discriminatory policy. (Case 5 of Theorem 1 and
Case 3-(1)-ii of Theorem 2)
2. Social welfare is maximized when both firms adopt the new technology, but only the
leader adopts the new technology without a subsidy. Then, the government should
subsidize only the follower. This policy is not discriminatory because adoption is the
dominant strategy for the leader. (Case 2 of Theorem 1)
3. Social welfare is maximized when both firms adopt the new technology, but no firm
adopts the new technology without a subsidy. Since adopting a new technology is the
best response for the follower when the leader adopts the new technology, the government
should subsidize only the leader. This policy is not discriminatory because the follower
1Alternatively, we can consider a five-stage game such that 1) the government determines the subsidy for each
firm, 2) the leader decides whether to adopt the new technology, 3) the follower decides whether to adopt the
new technology, 4) the leader determines its output, and 5) the follower determines its output.
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adopts the new technology without a subsidy. (Case 2-(1)-ii and Case 2-(2)-iii of
Theorem 2)
4. Social welfare is maximized when both firms adopt the new technology, but only the
follower adopts the new technology without a subsidy. The government should subsidize
only the leader. This policy is not discriminatory because adopting a new technology is
the dominant strategy for the follower. (Case 2-(2)-ii of Theorem 2)
Theorem 1 describes the case where goods are substitutes, and Theorem 2 that where goods
are complements. Our model is, at least mathematically, equivalent to a model of technology
license with a fixed license fee2.
In Section 2, we review related literature and present the model in Section 3. We analyze the
optimal subsidy policy when goods are substitutes and when they are complements in Sections
4 and 5, respectively.
2. Related literature
Many studies focus on the relationship between a technology licensor and licensee. Contracts
vary in terms of royalties, up-front fees, combinations of these two, and auction, which are
well discussed (Katz and Shapiro (1985), Kamien and Tauman (1986), Sen and Tauman
(2007)). Kamien and Tauman (1986) shows that if the licensor lacks production capacity, a
fixed fee is better than a royalty, and is also better for consumers. This topic is addressed under
Stackelberg oligopoly both when a licensor has production capacity (Wang and Yang (2004);
Kabiraj (2005); Filippini (2005)) and when it lacks production capacity (Kabiraj (2004)). La
Manna (1993) analyzes a Cournot oligopoly with a fixed fee under cost asymmetry, and shows
that if technologies can be replicated perfectly, a lower-cost firm always has an incentive to
transfer its technology. Hence, a Cournot-Nash equilibrium cannot be fully asymmetric, but
there exists no non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
On the other hand, using cooperative game theory, Watanabe and Muto (2008) analyses
bargaining between a licensor with no production capacity and oligopolistic firms. More recent
work analyzes market structure and technology improvement. Boone (2001) and Matsumura
et. al. (2013), respectively, find a non-monotonic relationship between the intensity of
competition and innovation. Additionally, Pal (2010) shows that technology adoption may
change the market outcome. Social welfare is larger in Bertrand competition than in Cournot
competition. However, if we consider technology adoption, Cournot competition may produce
greater social welfare than Bertrand competition in a diﬀerentiated goods market.
Elberfeld and Nti (2004) examine new technology adoption in an oligopoly with ex-
ante uncertainty about the associated variable costs, and shows that if in equilibrium both
technologies are employed, a higher level of uncertainty about the new technology increases
(decreases) the number of innovating firms and decreases (increases) the product’s price if the
up-front investment is large (small). Zhang et. al. (2014) analyzes the eﬀect of information
2There are two types of license contract: a fixed fee contract and a royalty contract. Similarly, we can consider a
specific or ad-valorem subsidy for new technology instead of a lump-sum subsidy. This is a theme for future
research.
3
spillovers with uncertain R&D outcomes in a two-stage Cournot oligopoly model where a
subset of firms first independently choose between two alternative production technologies
before all firms compete in quantity. Hattori and Y. Tanaka (2014) analyzes new technology
adoption in a Cournot duopoly with diﬀerentiated goods.
Liao and Sen (2005) analyzed a situation where an outside or incumbent innovator may use
a subsidy as a negative royalty from a licensee with a positive fixed fee. However, they did
not consider a government subsidy policy. However, Hattori and Y. Tanaka (2015) analyze
government subsidies or taxes for new technology adoption in a Cournot duopoly, and show
that if firms produce a homogeneous good, taxation is a better policy than subsidization.
3. Model
Consider a Stackelberg duopoly in which two firms, A and B, produce diﬀerentiated goods.
Firm A is the leader and Firm B is the follower. They consider adopting a new technology
from a foreign country. The technology itself is free, but each firm will incur a fixed set-up
cost to adopt the new technology, such as for training employees. We denote the outputs of
Firms A and B with xA and xB , and the prices of their goods by pA and pB , respectively. The
consumer utility function is:
u D a.xA C xB/   1
2
x2A   bxAxB  
1
2
x2B ;
where a > 0. If goods are substitutes, 0 < b < 1; if they are complements,  1 < b < 0.
From this utility function, the inverse demand functions of the goods are derived as follows.
pA D a   xA   bxB ; pB D a   xB   bxA:
The marginal cost of both firms before adopting the new technology is c > 0, and zero
afterward. The fixed set-up cost to adopt the new technology is e > 0.
Assumption 1. We assume that a is suﬃciently large, and jbj is not so large, such
that a > c
1 b is satisfied. For example, a > 2c and jbj < 1=2.
If jbj is large, for example, b D 1 (the goods are homogeneous), taxation may be
a better policy than subsidization, a theme for future research. In this paper, we
focus on comparing cases of substitutes and complements, with no taxation case3.
If a firm is indiﬀerent as towhether to adopt the new technology, it adopts the new technology.
3Hattori and Y. Tanaka (2015) show that taxation is a better policy than subsidization in a Cournot duopoly
with a homogeneous good under linear cost functions.
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4. Case of substitutes
4.1. Firm behavior
Assume that goods are substitutes. The profits for Firm A (the leader) and B (the follower)
before adopting the new technology are
A D .a   xA   bxB/xA   cxA; B D .a   xB   bxA/xB   cxB :
The profits after adoption become
A D .a   xA   bxB/xA   e; B D .a   xB   bxA/xB   e:
The conditions to maximize profit when both firms adopt the new technology are
a  

2C bdxB
dxA

xA   bxB D 0; a   2xB   bxA D 0;
where
dxB
dxA
D  b
2
:
This is common to all cases. The condition for Firm A is rewritten as
a  

2   b
2
2

xA   bxB D 0:
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D 2   b
2.2   b2/a; xB D
4   2b   b2
4.2   b2/ a:
The prices of the goods are
pA D 2   b
4
a; pB D 4   2b   b
2
4.2   b2/ a:
The firms’ profits are written as
2A D
.2   b/2
8.2   b2/a
2   e; 2B D
.4   2b   b2/2
16.2   b2/2 a
2   e:
The conditions to maximize profit when no firm adopts the new technology are
a  

2   b
2
2

xA   bxB   c D 0; a   2xB   bxA   c D 0:
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D 2   b
2.a   b2/.a   c/; xB D
4   2b   b2
4.2   b2/ .a   c/:
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The prices of the goods are
pA D 2   b
4
.a   c/; pB D 4   2b   b
2
4.2   b2/ .a   c/:
The firms’ profits are written as
0A D
.2   b/2
8.2   b2/.a   c/
2; 0B D
.4   2b   b2/2
16.2   b2/2 .a   c/
2:
The conditions to maximize profit when only Firm A adopts the new technology are
a  

2   b
2
2

xA   bxB D 0; a   2xB   bxA   c D 0:
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D .2   b/aC bc
2.2   b2/ ; xB D
.4   2b   b2/a   .4   b2/c
4.2   b2/ :
The prices of the goods are
pA D .2   b/aC bc
4
; pB D .4   2b   b
2/a   .4   b2/c
4.2   b2/ C c:
The firms’ profits are written as
AA D
.2   b/aC bc2
8.2   b2/   e; 
A
B D
.4   2b   b2/a   .4   b2/c2
16.2   b2/2 :
Similarly, when only Firm B adopts the new technology, the equilibrium outputs are
xA D .2   b/a   2c
2.2   b2/ ; xB D
.4   2b   b2/aC 2bc
4.2   b2/ :
The prices of the goods are
pA D .2   b/a   2c
4
C c; pB D .4   2b   b
2/aC 2bc
4.2   b2/ :
The firms’ profits are written as
BA D
.2   b/a   2c2
8.2   b2/ ; 
B
B D
.4   2b   b2/aC 2bc2
16.2   b2/2   e:
Comparing the firms’ profits before and after adoption yields
2A   BA D
.2a   ab   c/c
2.2   b2/   e; 
A
A   0A D
.2aC bc   ab   c/c
2.2   b2/   e;
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2B   AB D
.2   b/.2C b/.8a   4ab   2ab2   4c C b2c/c
16.2   b2/2   e;
BB   0B D
.2   b/.2C b/.8a   4ab   2ab2 C 4bc   4c C b2c/c
16.2   b2/2   e:
Let
e2A D
.2a   ab   c/c
2.2   b2/ ; e
1
A D
.2aC bc   ab   c/c
2.2   b2/ ;
e2B D
.2   b/.2C b/.8a   4ab   2ab2   4c C b2c/c
16.2   b2/2 ;
e1B D
.2   b/.2C b/.8a   4ab   2ab2 C 4bc   4c C b2c/c
16.2   b2/2 :
Then:
1. If and only if e  e2B , the best response of Firm B when Firm A adopts the new
technology is to adopt the new technology.
2. If and only if e  e1B , the best response of Firm B when Firm A does not adopt the new
technology is to adopt the new technology.
On the other hand, for Firm A:
1. If and only if e  e2A, the best response of FirmAwhen FirmB adopts the new technology
is to adopt the new technology.
2. If and only if e  e1A, the best response of Firm A when Firm B does not adopt new
technology is to adopt the new technology.
We now find
e1B   e2B D
.2   b/.2C b/bc2
4.2   b2/2 > 0; e
1
A   e2A D
bc2
2.2   b2/ > 0:
Then, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 1. When goods are substitutes;
1. a) If e  e2B , new technology adoption is the dominant strategy for Firm B.
b) If e2B < e  e1B , new technology adoption is the best response for Firm B when
Firm A does not adopt, and non-adoption is the best response for Firm B when
Firm A adopts the new technology.
c) If e > e1B , non-adoption of the new technology is the dominant strategy for Firm B.
2. a) If e  e2A, Firm A adopts the new technology whether Firm B’s strategy is adoption
or non-adoption.
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AB
B
adopt
not
adopt
not
adopt
not
(𝜋2𝐴,𝜋2𝐵)
(𝜋𝐴𝐴,𝜋𝐴𝐵)
(𝜋𝐵𝐴,𝜋𝐵𝐵)
(𝜋0𝐴,𝜋0𝐵)
Figure 1: Game tree
b) If e2A < e  e1A, Firm A adopts the new technology when Firm B does not adopt,
and it does not adopt the new technology when Firm B adopts.
c) If e > e1A, Firm A does not adopt the new technology whether Firm B’s strategy is
adoption or non-adoption.
The game is depicted in Fig. 1.
We have
e2A   e1B D
.4ab2   2ab3 C b3c C 4b2c   16c/bc
16.2   b2/2 ; e
2
A   e2B D
.4a   2ab C bc/b3c
16.2   b2/2 ;
e1A   e1B D
.4a   2ab C bc   4c/b3c
16.2   b2/2 :
Although e1A   e1B > 0 and e2A   e2B > 0 for reasonable values of variables, e2A   e1B may be
positive or negative. For example, when a D 10; b D 1
2
; c D 4, e1A  e1B D 849 , e2A  e2B D 1649
and e2A   e1B D  10449 ; when a D 200; b D 12 ; c D 4, e1A   e1B D 29349 , e2A   e2B D 437 and
e2A   e1B D 18149 . However, we obtain the same conclusion in both cases.
The sub-game perfect equilibria after the second stage are as follows:
Lemma 2. 1. If e  e2B , both firms adopt the new technology.
2. If e2B < e  e1A, only Firm A adopts the new technology.
3. If e > e1A, no firm adopts the new technology.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Note that there exists no equilibrium where only Firm B adopts the new technology.
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4.2. Social welfare and policy
Social welfare is defined as the sum of consumer surplus and firms’ profits, which is equal to
consumer utility minus production costs, including the set-up costs for the new technology.
Subsidies are financed by lump-sum taxes on consumers, which are not related to the goods
produced by the firms. Excluding income eﬀects, these taxes do not aﬀect demand for the
goods, and are oﬀset by subsidies.
We denote social welfare when both firms adopt the new technology asW 2, that when only
Firm A adopts the new technology as W A, that when only Firm B adopts the new technology
as W B , and that when no firm adopts the new technology as W 0. Then, we have
W 2 D a.xACxB/  1
2
x2A bxAxB 
1
2
x2B 2e D
a2.3b4 C 28b3   48b2   64b C 96/
32.2   b2/2  2e;
W A DaxA C .a   c/xB   1
2
x2A   bxAxB  
1
2
x2B   e
D 1
32.2   b2/2 .3b
4c2   28b2c2 C 48c2   6ab4c   28ab3c C 56ab2c C 64abc
  96ac C 3a2b4 C 28a2b3   48a2b2   64a2b C 96a2/   e;
W B D.a   c/xA C axB   1
2
x2A   bxAxB  
1
2
x2B   e
D 1
32.2   b2/2 . 20b
2c2 C 48c2   28ab3c C 40ab2c C 64abc
  96ac C 3a2b4 C 28a2b3   48a2b2   64a2b C 96a2/   e;
and
W 0 D .a c/.xACxB/ 1
2
x2A bxAxB 
1
2
x2B D
.3b4 C 28b3   48b2   64b C 96/.a   c/2
32.2   b2/2 :
We see that
W A  W B D .2a   c/.8   3b
2/b2c
32.2   b2/2 > 0:
Let
e20 D W
2 C 2e  W 0
2
D .2a   c/.3b
4 C 28b3   48b2   64b C 96/c
64.2   b2/2 ;
eA0 D W A  W 0 C e D .7ab
3   10ab2   16ab C 24a   7b3c C 5b2c C 16bc   12c/c
8.2   b2/2 ;
e2A D W 2  W A C e D .6ab
4 C 28ab3   56ab2   64ab C 96a   3b4c C 28b2c   48c/c
32.2   b2/2 ;
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eB0 D W B  W 0 C e
D .6ab
4 C 28ab3   56ab2   64ab C 96a   3b4c   28b3c C 28b2c C 64bc   48c/c
32.2   b2/2 ;
e2B D W 2  W B C e D .7ab
3   10ab2   16ab C 24aC 5b2c   12c/c
8.2   b2/2 :
All are positive under Assumption 1. We have
e2A   e2B D  .2a   c/.8   3b
2/b2c
32.2   b2/2 ;
e2A   e20 D  .16ab   6ab
3 C 3b3c   28b2c   8bc C 64c/bc
64.2   b2/2 ;
e2A   eB0 D .7b
2   16/bc2
8.2   b2/2 ;
e2A   eA0 D  .16ab   6ab
3 C 3b3c   28b2c   8bc C 64c/bc
32.2   b2/2 ;
e2B   eA0 D .7b
2   16/bc2
8.2   b2/2 ;
e20   eA0 D  .16ab   6ab
3 C 3b3c   28b2c   8bc C 64c/bc
64.2   b2/2 ;
eB0   eA0 D  .2a   c/.8   3b
2/b2c
32.2   b2/2 ;
For reasonable values of variables, all are negative. Therefore,
e2A < e2B ; e20; eB0 < eA0:
Thus, from W A > W B we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 3. 1. If e  e2A,W 2 is the maximum, then new technology adoption by both firms
is optimal.
2. If e2A < e  eA0, W A is the maximum, then new technology adoption by only Firm A
is optimal.
3. If e > eA0, W 0 is the maximum, then new technology adoption by no firm is optimal.
We now have
e2A   e1A
D . 3b
4c C 16b3c C 12b2c   32bc   16c C 6ab4 C 12ab3   24ab2   32ab C 32a/c
32.2   b2/2 > 0:
Therefore, we obtain the following theorem.
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Theorem 1. When goods are substitutes, the optimal policies are as follows:
1. If e  e2B , the government should do nothing.
2. If e2B < e  e2A, the government should subsidize only Firm B, at a level greater than
e e2B . Since Firm A adopts the new technology without a subsidy in this case, the policy
is not discriminatory.
3. If e2A < e  e1A, the government should subsidize both firms at a level greater than e e2A
for Firm A and e   e2B for Firm B.
4. If e1A < e  e2A, the government should subsidize both firms at a level greater than
e   e2A for Firm A and e   e2B for Firm B.
5. If e2A < e  eA0, the government should subsidize only Firm A, at a level greater than
e   e1A. Because Firm B does not adopt the new technology in this case, this policy is
discriminatory and favors Firm A, the leader.
6. If e > eA0, the government should do nothing.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The following table summarizes the results of this theorem.
1. e  e2B 2. e2B < e  e2A
W 2 is optimal,
both firms adopt the new technology,
and the government does nothing.
W 2 is optimal,
only Firm A adopts the new technology,
and the government subsidizes Firm B.
3. e2A < e  e1A 4. e1A < e  e2A
W 2 is optimal,
only Firm A adopts the new technology,
and the government subsidizes both firms.
W 2 is optimal,
no firm adopts the new technology,
and the government subsidizes both firms.
5. e2A < e  eA0 6. e > eA0
W A is optimal,
no firm adopts the new technology,
and the government subsidizes Firm A.
W 0 is optimal,
no firm adopts the new technology,
and the government does nothing.
5. Case of complements
5.1. Firm behavior
Assume that goods are complements. Similar to the previous section, let
e2A D 2A   BA D
.2a   ab   c/c
2.2   b2/ ; e
1
A D AA   0A D
.2a   ab   c C bc/c
2.2   b2/ ;
11
e2B D 2B   AB D
.2   b/.2C b/.8a   4ab   2ab2   4c C b2c/c
16.2   b2/2 ;
and
e1B D BB   0B D
.2   b/.2C b/.8a   4ab   2ab2 C 4bc   4c C b2c/c
16.2   b2/2 :
Since b < 0
e1B   e2B D
.2   b/.2C b/bc2
4.2   b2/2 < 0; e
1
A   e2A D
bc2
2.2   b2/ < 0;
we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 4. When goods are complements:
1. a) If e  e1B , new technology adoption is the dominant strategy for Firm B.
b) If e1B < e  e2B , new technology adoption is the best response for Firm B when
Firm A adopts the new technology, and non-adoption is the best response for Firm
B when Firm A does not adopt.
c) If e > e2B , non-adoption is the dominant strategy for Firm B.
2. a) If e  e1A, Firm A adopts the new technology whether Firm B’s strategy is adoption
or non-adoption.
b) If e1A < e  e2A, Firm A adopts the new technology when Firm B adopts, and it
does not adopt when Firm B does not adopt.
c) If e > e2A, Firm A does not adopt the new technology whether Firm B’s strategy is
adoption or non-adoption.
We have
e2A   e1B D
.4ab2   2ab3 C b3c C 4b2c   16c/bc
16.2   b2/2 ; e
2
A   e2B D
.4a   2ab C bc/b3c
16.2   b2/2 ;
e1A   e1B D
.4a   2ab C bc   4c/b3c
16.2   b2/2 :
Since b < 0, e1A  e1B < 0 and e2A  e2B < 0 for reasonable values of variables, though e2A  e1B
may be positive or negative. For example, when a D 10; b D  1
2
; c D 4, e1A   e1B D  1649 ,
e2A   e2B D  2449 and e2A   e1B D 9649 ; when a D 200; b D  12 ; c D 4, e1A   e1B D  49149 ,
e2A   e2B D  49949 and e2A   e1B D  37949 . The sub-game perfect equilibria after the second stage
depends on whether e2A > e1B or e2A < e1B . We can show the following lemma.
Lemma 5. 1. If e  e1A, both firms adopt the new technology.
2. If e1A < e  e2B , there are two cases:
a) If e2A > e1B , there are three sub-cases:
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i. If e1A < e  e1B , both firms adopt the new technology.
ii. If e1B < e  e2A, both firms adopt the new technology.
iii. If e2A < e  e2B , no firm adopts the new technology.
b) If e2A < e1B , there are three sub-cases:
i. If e1A < e  e2A, both firms adopt the new technology.
ii. If e2A < e  e1B , only Firm B adopts the new technology.
iii. If e1B < e  e2B , no firm adopts the new technology.
3. If e > e2B , no firm adopts the new technology.
Proof. See Appendix C
Note that there exists no equilibrium where only Firm A (the leader) adopts the new tech-
nology.
5.2. Social welfare and policy
Similar to the case of substitutes, we see:
W A  W B D .2a   c/.8   3b
2/b2c
32.2   b2/2 > 0:
Let
e20 D W
2 C 2e  W 0
2
D .2a   c/.3b
4 C 28b3   48b2   64b C 96/c
64.2   b2/2 ;
eA0 D W A  W 0 C e D .7ab
3   10ab2   16ab C 24a   7b3c C 5b2c C 16bc   12c/c
8.2   b2/2 ;
e2A D W 2  W A C e D .6ab
4 C 28ab3   56ab2   64ab C 96a   3b4c C 28b2c   48c/c
32.2   b2/2 ;
eB0 D W B  W 0 C e
D .6ab
4 C 28ab3   56ab2   64ab C 96a   3b4c   28b3c C 28b2c C 64bc   48c/c
32.2   b2/2 ;
e2B D W 2  W B C e D .7ab
3   10ab2   16ab C 24aC 5b2c   12c/c
8.2   b2/2 :
All are positive under Assumption 1. Comparing them;
e2A e2B D  .2a   c/.8   3b
2/b2c
32.2   b2/2 ; e
2A e20 D  .16ab   6ab
3 C 3b3c   28b2c   8bc C 64c/bc
64.2   b2/2 ;
e2A eB0 D .7b
2   16/bc2
8.2   b2/2 ; e
2A eA0 D  .16ab   6ab
3 C 3b3c   28b2c   8bc C 64c/bc
32.2   b2/2 ;
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e2B eA0 D .7b
2   16/bc2
8.2   b2/2 ; e
20 eA0 D  .16ab   6ab
3 C 3b3c   28b2c   8bc C 64c/bc
64.2   b2/2 ;
eB0   eA0 D  .2a   c/.8   3b
2/b2c
32.2   b2/2 ;
For reasonable values of variables,
e2A   e2B < 0; e2A   eB0 > 0; e2B   eA0 > 0; eB0   eA0 < 0:
However, e2A e20, e2A eA0 and e20 eA0may be positive or negative. Since e20 D e2ACeA0
2
,
there are two cases:
1. e2A  e20  eA0.
2. eA0 < e20 < e2A.
Thus, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 6. 1. When e2A  e20  eA0:
a) If e  e2A, W 2 is the maximum, then new technology adoption for both firms is
optimal.
b) If e2A < e  eA0, W A is the maximum, then new technology adoption by only
Firm A (the leader ) is optimal.
c) If e > eA0, W 0 is the maximum, then new technology adoption by no firm is
optimal.
2. When eA0 < e20 < e2A:
a) If e  e20, W 2 is the maximum, then new technology adoption by both firms is
optimal.
b) If e > e20,W 0 is the maximum, then new technology adoption by no firm is optimal.
We now have:
e2A   e2B
D .2ab
4 C 20ab3   24ab2   32ab C 32a   b4c C 12b2c   16c/c
32.2   b2/2 > 0;
eA0   e2B
D .16a   2ab
4 C 10ab3   4ab2   16ab C b4c   14b3c C 2b2c C 32bc   8c/c
16.2   b2/2 > 0:
Therefore, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 2. When goods are complements, the optimal policies are as follows:
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1. If e  e1A, the government should do nothing.
2. If e1A < e  e2B , there are two cases:
a) If e2A > e1B , there are two sub-cases:
i. If e1A < e  e2A, the government should do nothing.
ii. If e2A < e  e2B , the government should subsidize only Firm A. The level of
the subsidy is e   e2A. Since Firm B adopts new technology at the equilibrium
without subsidy, this policy is not discriminatory.
b) If e2A < e1B , there are three sub-cases.
i. If e1A < e  e2A, the government should do nothing.
ii. If e2A < e  e1B , the government should subsidize only Firm A at a level equal
to e   e2A. Since Firm B adopts the new technology at the equilibrium without
subsidy, this policy is not discriminatory.
iii. If e1B < e  e2B , the government should subsidize only Firm A at a level equal
to e   e2A. Since Firm B adopts the new technology at the equilibrium without
subsidy, this policy is not discriminatory.
3. If e > e2B , there are two cases:
a) If e2A  e20  eA0, there are three sub-cases:
i. If e2B < e  e2A, the government should subsidize both firms at levels equal
to e   e2A and e   e2B for Firm A and B, respectively.
ii. If e2A < e  eA0, the government should subsidize only Firm A at a level
equal to e   e1A. Since Firm B does not adopt the new technology at the
equilibrium, this policy is discriminatory.
iii. If e > eA0, the government should do nothing.
b) If eA0 < e20 < e2A, there are two sub-cases:
i. If e2B < e  e20, the government should subsidize both firms at levels equal to
e   e2A and e   e2B for Firm A and B, respectively.
ii. If e > e20, the government should do nothing.
Proof. See Appendix D.
The following table summarizes the results of this theorem.
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1. e  e1A 2. (1) i. e2A > e1B ; e1A < e  e2A
W 2 is optimal,
both firms adopt the new technology,
and the government does nothing.
W 2 is optimal,
both firms adopt the new technology,
and the government does nothing.
2. (1) ii. e2A > e1B ; e2A < e  e2B 2. (2) i. e2A < e1B ; e1A < e  e2A
W 2 is optimal,
no firm adopts the new technology,
and the government subsidizes Firm A;
then Firm B also adopts the new technology.
W 2 is optimal,
both firms adopt the new technology,
and the government does nothing.
2. (2) ii. e2A < e1B ; e2A < e  e1B 2. (2) iii. e2A < e1B ; e1B < e  e2B
W 2 is optimal,
only Firm B adopts the new technology,
and the government subsidizes Firm A.
W 2 is optimal,
no firm adopts the new technology,
and the government subsidizes Firm A;
then Firm B also adopts the new technology.
3. (1) i. e2A  e20  eA0; e2B < e  e2A 3. (1) ii. e2A  e20  eA0; e2A < e  eA0
W 2 is optimal,
no firm adopts the new technology,
and the government subsidizes both firms.
W A is optimal,
no firm adopts the new technology,
and the government subsidizes Firm A.
3. (1) iii. e2A  e20  eA0; e > eA0 3. (2) i. eA0 < e20 < e2A; e2B < e  e20
W 0 is optimal,
no firm adopts the new technology,
and the government does nothing.
W 2 is optimal,
no firm adopts the new technology,
and the government subsidizes both firms.
3. (2) ii. eA0  e20  e2A; e > e20
W 0 is optimal,
no firm adopts the new technology,
and the government does nothing.
6. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we analyzed optimal subsidization policies for new technology adoption in
a Stackelberg duopoly. However, sub-game perfect equilibria and optimal policies are not
simple, and depend on the magnitude of the set-up costs and whether the firms produce
substitute or complementary goods. In our model, firms’ incentives to adopt new technology
are often insuﬃcient, and in which case the government should subsidize firms.
We assumed linear demand and cost functions, though would like to generalize the results
to general demand and cost functions.
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Appendices
A. Proof of Lemma 2
1. In this case, new technology adoption is the dominant strategy for both firms.
2. When e2A   e1B > 0, there are three sub-cases:
a) e2B < e  e1B . Then, adoption is the dominant strategy for Firm A, and non-
adoption is the best response for Firm B to Firm A’s adoption.
b) e1B < e  e2A. Then, adoption is the dominant strategy for Firm A, and non-
adoption is the dominant strategy for Firm B.
c) e2A < e  e1A. Then, adoption is the best response for Firm A to non-adoption by
Firm B, and non-adoption is the dominant strategy for Firm B.
When e2A   e1B < 0, there are three sub-cases:
a) e2B < e  e2A. Then, adoption is the dominant strategy for Firm A, and non-
adoption is the best response for Firm B to Firm A’s adoption.
b) e2A < e  e1B . Then, adoption is the best response for Firm A to non-adoption by
Firm B, and non-adoption is the best response for Firm B to Firm A’s adoption. On
the other hand, non-adoption is the best response for Firm A to Firm B’s adoption,
and adoption is the best response for Firm B to non-adoption by FirmA. Thus, there
are two Nash equilibria: a state where only Firm A adopts the new technology and
the other where only Firm B adopts the new technology. The diﬀerence between
Firm A’s profit when it adopts the new technology and that when Firm B adopts
the new technology is
AA   BA D
.2   b/.2C b/c.2a   c/
8.2   b2/   e:
Comparing .2 b/.2Cb/c.2a c/
8.2 b2/ with e
1
B ,
.2   b/.2C b/c.2a   c/
8.2   b2/   e
1
B D
.2   b/.2C b/.bc   4c   2ab C 4a/bc
16.2   b2/2 > 0:
Thus, Firm A chooses to adopt the new technology in the second stage, and only
Firm A adopts the new technology at the sub-game perfect equilibrium.
c) e1B < e  e1A. Then, adoption is the best response for Firm A to non-adoption by
Firm B, and non-adoption is the dominant strategy for Firm B.
3. In this case, non-adoption is the dominant strategy for both firms.
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B. Proof of Theorem 1
1. When W 2 is optimal, both firms adopt the new technology without a subsidy, and the
government should do nothing.
2. In this case, W 2 is optimal; however, only Firm A adopts the new technology without
a subsidy. Since e  e2A, Firm A adopts the new technology without a subsidy. The
government should subsidize Firm B at a level greater than e   e2B .
3. When W 2 is optimal, only Firm A adopts the new technology without a subsidy. The
government should subsidize both firms at levels greater than e   e2A for Firm A and
e   e2B for Firm B. Since e2A > e2B , we have e   e2A < e   e2B . Since e2A < e  e1A, if
the government subsidizes only Firm B, then Firm A does not adopt the new technology.
Thus, the government should subsidize both firms.
4. When W 2 is optimal, no firm adopts the new technology without a subsidy. The
government should thus subsidize both firms at levels greater than e  e2A for Firm A and
e   e2B for Firm B. Because e2A > e2B , we have e   e2A < e   e2B .
5. When W A is optimal, no firm adopts the new technology without a subsidy. The
government should subsidize one firm, either Firm A or Firm B. However, since W A >
W B , the government should subsidize only Firm A at a level greater than e   e1A.
6. When W 0 is optimal, no firm adopts the new technology without a subsidy, and the
government should do nothing.
C. Proof of Lemma 5
1. Adopting the new technology is the dominant strategy for both firms.
2. a) i. When adoption is the dominant strategy for Firm B and adoption is the best
response for FirmAwhen FirmB adopts, both firms adopt the new technology.
ii. When adoption is the best response for both firms when the rival adopts the
new technology, and non-adoption is the best response for both firms when
the rival does not adopt, there are two equilibria. In the first, both firms adopt
the new technology; in the second, neither firm adopts the new technology.
Comparing the profit of Firm A (the leader) when both firms adopt the new
technology and that when no firm adopts yields
2A   0A D
.2a   c/.2   b/2c
8.2   b2/ > 0:
Therefore, Firm A chooses to adopt the new technology, and both firms adopt
the new technology at the sub-game perfect equilibrium.
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iii. When non-adoption is the dominant strategy for Firm A and non-adoption is
the best response for Firm B when Firm A does not adopt, neither firm adopts
the new technology.
b) i. When adoption is the dominant strategy for Firm B, and adoption is the best
response for FirmAwhen FirmB adopts. both firms adopt the new technology.
ii. When adoption is the dominant strategy for Firm B, and non-adoption is the
dominant strategy for Firm A, only Firm B adopts the new technology.
iii. When non-adoption is the dominant strategy for Firm A, and non-adoption is
the best response for Firm B when Firm A does not adopt, no firm adopts the
new technology.
3. In the final case, non-adoption of the new technology is the dominant strategy for both
firms.
D. Proof of Theorem 2
1. When W 2 is optimal and both firms adopt the new technology without a subsidy, the
government should do nothing.
2. a) i. When W 2 is optimal and both firms adopt the new technology without a
subsidy, the government should do nothing.
ii. WhenW 2 is optimal and no firm adopts the new technology without a subsidy,
the government should subsidize only Firm A at a level equal to e e2A because
adoption is the best response for Firm B when Firm A adopts.
b) i. When W 2 is optimal and both firms adopt the new technology without a
subsidy, the government should do nothing.
ii. When W 2 is optimal, but only Firm B adopts the new technology without a
subsidy because it is the dominant strategy for Firm B, the government should
subsidize only Firm A.
iii. When W 2 is optimal, but no firm adopts the new technology, the government
should subsidize only Firm A because new technology adoption is the best
response for Firm B when Firm A adopts.
3. a) i. WhenW 2 is optimal, but no firm adopts the new technology without a subsidy,
and non-adoption is the dominant strategy for both firms, the government
should subsidize both firms.
ii. WhenW A is optimal, but no firm adopts the new technologywithout a subsidy,
the government should subsidize only Firm A.
iii. WhenW 0 is optimal and no firm adopts the new technology without a subsidy,
the government should do nothing.
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b) i. WhenW 2 is optimal, but no firm adopts the new technology without a subsidy,
and non-adoption is the dominant strategy for both firms, the government
should subsidize both firms.
ii. If e > e20, W 0 is optimal and no firm adopts the new technology without a
subsidy, and the government should do nothing.
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